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Abstract 
Training is an essential component of ensuring safe operations. Here we consider the relationship between training 
and organizational risk and create a conceptual model illustrating how risk is decreased by training, and how a lack of 
training increases risk. We construct our model by combining insights from the literature on training, both at the 
individual and organizational levels, with insights from the literature on accident causation. We represent risk as a 
combination of the probability and consequences of accidents, and training as combination of topic coverage (depth 
and breadth), organization coverage (how much of the organization is exposed to training), and frequency (how often 
it occurs). Our model incorporates several critical aspects of the relationship between training and risk. First, it 
captures path dependence—that is, risk does not follow the same curve when training is increased as when training is 
decreased. Second, and building on the first point, risk lags changes in training. When training is decreased, risk does 
not immediately increase, and, conversely, when training is increased, risk does not immediately decrease. This time 
lag can contribute to training being cut when resources are tight, or to training being seen as ineffective. Third, we 
consider how the characteristics of a particular organization affect the risk-training curve and demonstrate how the 
curve can be tailored for a particular organization. 
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1. Introduction 
Training is an essential component of organization to ensure safe operations. Consider for example the 
China Airlines Flight 140 accident in 1994 [1]. During approach, the A300-600R aircraft was under the 
control of the first-officer when he inadvertently triggered the go-around mode. The captain took over but 
failed to switch the go-around mode into land mode and continued to approach incorrectly because he did 
not understand the auto-pilot function of Automatic Flight System on the aircraft. As a result, the aircraft 
climbed steeply, stalled, rolled, and crashed into the ground. Only 7 of the 271 people on board survived. 
The ensuing accident investigation found that inadequate flight crew training was to blame. The captain 
had recently qualified on the A300-600R and had not been trained on the aircraft’s go-around model 
because the simulator contractors had not updated the simulator to the correct go-around model. 
Inadequate training occurs for many reasons. It may for example be cut because of resource constraints 
[2,3]. As observed by Rogers commission after Space Shuttle Challenger accident of NASA, under the 
pressure of planned increased flight frequency, NASA compressed the training schedule obviously before 
the accident which led less and less time available for crew members to accomplish required training [4]. 
Inadequate training may also be due to a lack of knowledge about training needs in the organization. For 
example, operators at Three Mile Island were only trained to detect a particular set of catastrophic 
accident scenarios [5]. They were not trained to detect less catastrophic events.  
One way to reduce the likelihood of inadequate training is to make the link between training and risk 
explicit. In this paper we therefore develop a model of the relationship between training and accident risk 
by viewing training as a way of acquiring knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs). These KSAs in turn 
affect how employees perform their duties, and hence how they reduce or increase the risk of accidents. 
To achieve this goal we begin by reviewing in Section 2 the current understanding of how inadequate 
training induced accidents occur in complex socio-technical systems. Next, in Section 3 we present a four-
step approach to model the relationship between training and risk. Section 4 demonstrates the application 
of the model to a particular organization. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Safety Impact of Training on Complex Socio-Technical Systems 
Accidents that can be solely blamed on mechanical failure or factors beyond the control of the 
organization are rare, especially for organizations operating in high-risk areas such as commercial aviation, 
space technology, nuclear power, and chemical process plants. Simple physical component failure and 
individual error are inadequate explanations for accidents in complex socio-technical systems [6,7]. The 
root causes involve factors at all levels of the socio-technical system and further upstream in organization, 
such as supervisory standards, management directives, and corporate leadership [8]. For example, in 
January 2000, Alaska Airline Flight 261, a MD-80 aircraft, went into an uncontrolled descent and crashed 
into the Pacific Ocean, killing all on board [9]. The ensuing investigation found that the horizontal 
stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly had not been lubricated properly, in part due to inadequate 
training of maintenance technicians. 
Training is a significant factor in accidents. Shappell and Wiegmann analyzed over 16 000 aviation 
accidents in the United States involving human error from 1990 to 2000 [10]. They found that 68% of 
non-scheduled commercial accidents and 78% of general aviation accidents were caused by skill-based 
pilot errors. In contrast, in scheduled commercial and military aviation the rate was 55% and 60% 
respectively. They surmised that the higher rates in non-scheduled commercial and general aviation occur 
because these pilots receive less recurrent training and less opportunity to maintain proficiency than 
typical commercial and military pilots.  
315 Lu Yi et al. /  Procedia Engineering  80 ( 2014 )  313 – 328 
In this paper, organizational risk is defined as the likelihood and consequences of accidents involving 
technical systems [11]. We are interested specifically in what the Baker Panel refers to as “process 
accidents”, as opposed to occupational safety accidents [12]. The technical system may be developed, 
manufactured, and maintained by the organization or its contractors, or purchased from other companies. 
Many models of accident causation have been proposed, here we use Reason’s model of accident 
pathogens to illustrate the importance of training [13]. In this model, latent organizational failures, or 
accident pathogens, may lie dormant of a long time and only become evident when they combine with 
local triggering factors [13]. For example, to increase daily productivity, employees routinely violate 
some safety rules, without immediately causing accidents. But such routine violation results in a migration 
to safety boundaries as more safety rules are violated over time. Reason listed “deficiencies in training” as 
one of eleven generic latent organizational failures types. Combining with the open system model concept 
of training process, Reason’s conclusion of the failure of training is illustrated in Fig. 1 [6,13]. 
 
Fig. 1: Open system model of training failures [6,13] 
Reason’s emphasis on the importance of training is echoed by many researchers. However, few 
researchers have attempted to provide a direct link between the level of training and the level of risk. As a 
result, it is difficult for organizations to assess proactively whether their training level is adequate. This 
paper is a first step towards such a model. In the next section, we construct a conceptual model that 
relates the level of training to the level of risk. 
3. Modeling the Impact of Training on Organizational Risk 
An organization’s risk of accidents is primarily determined by its members’ decision and actions [6]. 
Employee training is a systematic approach to learning and development to improve individual, team, or 
organizational effectiveness, productivity, and safety [14,15]. Its effectiveness is judged by the abilities of 
employees to perform their tasks safely with the desired proficiency [16].  
In this section we propose and discuss the approach shown in Fig. 2 to model the impact of training on 
risk. The figure reads as follows. Stepping backwards from the organizational risk block on the right hand 
side, we argue that risk is influenced significantly by employee performance, which in turn is affected by 
employee knowledge, skills, and attitudes, the “KSAs” [14,16,17]. Typically, KSAs development requires 
both training and experience. Finally, these KSAs are determined both by employee’s baseline KSAs and 
by training while at the organization. 
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Fig. 2 Modeling process and relevant factors of the dynamics of training and organizational risk 
3.1. Step 1: Conceptual modeling of the relationship between training and organizational KSA 
In the context of an organization, an employee is “qualified” if she knows “what and when” to do 
specific actions (knowledge) and can “do” those things with ease and precision (skills) [18,19]. She also 
has necessary beliefs and opinions (attitude) that drives or inhibits her behaviors. To describe the 
proficiency of employees to perform their job in a specific organization, several researchers suggest using 
the average KSA of employees across the organization [20,21]. For convenience we refer to this average 
as the “organizational KSA”, and interpret it as an indication of the proportion and extent of employee 
KSAs. Thus a high organizational KSA implies that most employees have high individual KSAs. 
Conversely, a low organizational KSA implies that most employees have low individual KSAs. In this 
section, we model the formation process of organizational KSA, as shown in Fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3 Modeling process of training-organizational KSA 
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First, we suggest three dimensions to assess the extent of training. Next, we distinguish between five 
different job categories in Section 3.1.2, and discuss four task types relevant to these job categories in 
Section 3.1.3. Then we model the formation of organizational KSA as a combination of KSA learning, 
retention and transfer processes affected by three general training methods: mastery, refresher and 
adapting training. Finally, we suggest a model of the relationship between the extent of training and 
Organization KSA. 
3.1.1 Training Dimensions 
In most organizations, the level of training is measured by the cost of training, such as average 
expenditure per trainee, or learning hours used in training. However, these indicators are organization and 
task dependent and cannot fully reflect the quality of training provided. For example, if an airline spends a 
lot of resources on flight attendant training but less on maintenance technician training, the well-trained 
flight attendants will not be able to compensate for the poorly trained maintenance technicians. In this 
paper, we therefore define three dimensions of training as follows: 
x Topic coverage measures the depth and breadth of training. Depth of training refers to the extent of 
training on specific KSAs, such as developing special training software to simulate an emergency 
operating procedure to reduce operator errors. Breadth of training refers to how many types of KSAs 
are involved in the training program. For example Crew Resource Management emphasizes the KSAs 
of aircrews in five aspects: communication, situational awareness, decision making, teamwork and 
barriers [22]. 
x Organizational coverage measures the extent of training across the organization. For example, an 
airline that only trained flight attendants would have low organizational coverage. 
x Training frequency measures how often training recurs. As discussed later, many tasks required 
frequent training if proficiency is to be retained.  
3.1.2 Job Categories 
Most research has focused on operator training and error, or on the importance of top-level leadership 
in ensuring safety. Between these two extremes lies a wide range of different employees. For example, a 
draughtsman can create a hazardous design by making an error on a drawing. Or an engineer may select 
an inadequate bolt that subsequently shears off during operation. We therefore propose here the following 
five generic types of employees: 
x Organization managers, including high-level and line managers of a department or functional area 
within an organization, are responsible and accountable for planning, organizing, implementing, and 
evaluating tasks to accomplish desired goals. They are also responsible for directing, guiding, leading, 
and monitoring employees [23]. 
x Technical system engineers are concerned with applying scientific knowledge, mathematics, and 
ingenuity to develop solutions for technical problems [23]. Their responsibilities include defining 
problems, conducting research, analyzing time and cost, finding and selecting solutions [24].  
x Technical system manufacturers are responsible for producing technical products for use or sale 
using labor, machines, tools, chemical and biological processing, or formulation [23]. 
x Technical system maintainers are responsible for maintaining compliance to scheduled maintenance 
intervals, methods, and procedures to meet with desired quality [6].   
x Technical system operator are responsible for ensuring the maintenance of technical systems and, if 
necessary, the development of technical system in a given area and for the ability of system to meet 
desired performance and safety goals [25]. 
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Each job category interacts with the technical systems in terms of how close they are to the system and 
in terms of the breadth of scope, as shown in Fig. 4.  
 
Fig. 4. Work scope and distance from technical system of different job categories 
High-level managers must establish the safety priority in the organization. Without such commitment 
the organization cannot maintain safety. Line managers must implement safety policy by transferring it 
into practical and visible safety activities. These activities include planning task scheduling, selecting and 
pairing staff, supervising safety performance, reviewing technical system and workplace safety, and 
implementing training evaluation of safety individuals [26]. 
Engineers must work to eliminate the precondition of unsafe acts of manufacturers, maintainers and 
pilot in the aspect of physical system and relevant detailed procedures. Most of their tasks are cognitive 
and open-looped. Their safety knowledge from safety theory and previous experience, skills on risk 
analysis techniques and safety design, and positive attitude to check their design compliance to technical 
standards with rigorous tests are all critical to support their high-level performance to reduce inherent 
risks.  
The technical system manufacturers and maintainers are responsible to realize and maintain the 
physical system under the requirements of design and relevant constraints of industrial standards and 
organizational regulations. They have direct contact on technical systems. If they lack of safety 
knowledge, adequate performance proficiency and accuracy, and continuous personal commitment on 
safety, the manufacturing flaws, maintenance errors, and unsafe occupational risk will be high.  
When implementing the active operating actions on technical system, the operators have the nearest 
distance with the technical system. Their tasks are most integrated. Their inadequate fundamental 
knowledge, unsafe decision and skill-based errors such as poorly executed procedures, inadvertent 
action/deactivation, forgotten intentions and omitted items, perceptual errors such as fail to perceive risky 
situation, and rule violations will directly induce accident [2]. 
3.1.3. Task Types 
Training differs from education in its emphasis on preparation for specific tasks. As mentioned 
previously, the KSAs emphasized by training should be consistent with the requirements of specific tasks. 
For example, instrument flight tasks under complicated weather conditions require the pilot to understand 
instrument flight rules and master relevant flight skills. 
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Tasks can be divided into routine and emergency tasks. Routine tasks are frequently performed and 
therefore employees are highly familiar with them. In contrast, emergency tasks are usually conducted 
under high-pressure conditions that pose an immediate risk to health, life, property, or environment. 
Because of their much lower frequencies, employees usually have less experience on how to perform 
them appropriately. Tasks may also differ considerably in terms of difficulty, complexity and level of 
integration. They can be classified according to their occurrence, e.g., whether they require primarily 
physical or cognitive skills, and according to the operating mechanism, e.g., whether they have a clear 
beginning and end with unambiguous requirements, or are less well defined [27,28] , as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Task Types of employee [27,28] 
Occurrence mechanism Operating mechanism 
Physical tasks Cognitive tasks Open-looped tasks Closed-looped tasks 
Require muscular 
strength, exertion of 
forces, endurance and 
coordination. 
For example, a pilot 
keeps the aircraft a 
level flight by pulling 
stick with a continuous 
force. 
Involve perceptual input, 
mental operations, 
problem solving and 
decision making. 
For example, a line 
manager understands the 
principles of a chemical 
process and knows when 
to tell the operator to add 
feeds into reaction vessel. 
Involve continuous responses with no 
beginning/end and more likely to be 
part of everyday life, leading to 
practice thus leading to re-learning, 
such as continuous control or 
perceptual-motor tasks like flight 
control, target identification. 
For example, an operator judge 
whether a chemical process is 
working in its design range through 
the temperature reading. 
Involve discrete responses that 
have a definitive beginning and 
end. They lack of inherent 
organization or logic, maintained 
by retraining or practice, such as 
procedural tasks like preflight 
checking. 
For example, a maintainer checks 
the function of flight control 
system based on system 
specification before flight. 
These task types are not mutually exclusive; tasks typically involve one or more aspects. Table 2 shows 
how they map to the job categories presented in the previous section. 
Table 2. Task categories of job-specified employees in the technical system committed organization 
Job Categories 
Task Clusters 
Routine Tasks Emergency Tasks 
Organization manager Cognitive, Open-looped Cognitive, Open-Looped, Closed-looped 
Technical system engineer Cognitive, Open-looped N/A 
Technical system manufacturer 
Physical, Cognitive, 
Open-looped, Closed-looped 
Technical system maintainer 
Technical system operator 
 
3.1.4. Organization KSA Formation Process 
As shown by the dark gray block in Fig. 3, learning, retention, and transfer constitute the formation 
process of organizational KSAs. 
Learning is a relatively permanent change in cognition (e.g., understanding and thinking) that results 
from experience (e.g. education and training) and that directly influences behavior [16]. The S-shaped 
learning curve is most obvious when someone learns a highly complex task [29,30,31,32], as shown in 
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Fig. 5. Initially learning increases slowly as a person becomes familiar with the basic components of a 
skill. The steep ascending phase occurs when there is enough experience with simple components to start 
“putting it all together”. Rapid progress follows until the skill stabilizes at a maximum competence. 
Trainee characteristics affect the shape of learning curve. Better-prepared trainees reach the acceleration 
part of the curve more rapidly. An employee with previous similar task experience or appropriate 
educational background may show rapid progress in the initial phase of learning [14,16]. The rate of 
acceleration is affected by trainee ability and motivation [18,19,33]. Motivation is affected by trainees’ 
attitudes such as whether they believe that they are able to acquire the knowledge and skills, that the 
trainer is qualified, and that the training is necessary and important for their work. Training ability also 
influences the final amount learned. A specific ability may govern skills on a number of related tasks. For 
example, logical ability is useful for both programming and inspection tasks.  
 
Fig. 5. The S-shape “learning curve” typical of complex learning [31] 
Generally, tasks with more open-looped components take longer to learn. In contrast, cognitive tasks 
with more closed-looped components are acquired rapidly [34]. To ensure the KSAs can be learned 
adequately, organizations often use mastery training, or overlearning to add extra practice beyond what is 
required to achieve basic competence [35,36]. Mastery learning is critical for emergency tasks in which 
employees are usually to make decision and implement procedures in high-stress situations automatically 
and correctly without thinking [37], such as when a pilot implements emergency procedures to deal with 
an engine failure. 
Once KSAs are learned they can deteriorate in various ways. Knowledge retention involves recall and 
recognition [38,39]. Factual information can last longer in the memory if it has clear logic, is stored with a 
specific structure, and can be reinforced by rehearsal. In contrast, procedural information is more 
vulnerable to forgetting, especially without retrieval cues and necessary practice [40]. For example, 
checklists provide a sequence of retrieval cues that help to reduce error. Skill retention denotes the 
successful recall or recognition of a task some time after last performing that task [34]. It is usually 
measured by comparing performance before, during, and after a period of controlled activity—the 
retention interval. Attitude retention is usually determined by whether the employee can achieve desired 
outcomes (e.g., salary, position, or occupational safety) and self-efficacy after they performed tasks with 
relevant KSAs. In general, KSAs are retained better when they are initially acquired at a higher level [41]. 
In the absence of practice or other reinforcement, skill initially deteriorates rapidly and then slows 
down [42]. Some skills are retained better than others. When tasks are not exercised regularly in the work 
context, cognitive tasks are usually retained better than physical tasks because they more readily lend 
Number of trials or attempts at learning
Performance measures
Slow beginning
Steep acceleration
Plateau
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themselves to mental practice in the absence of overt physical movement [28]. Closed-looped skills that 
involve discrete steps, specific sequencing, without cues, cannot be maintained without practice 
[34,43,44]. In contrast, open-looped or cognitive skills such as engineering calculations deteriorate more 
slowly. Practice is important for maintaining KSAs. For routine tasks, practice occurs frequently. Such 
self re-learning can help skills to be retained or improved. Practice is critical for emergency tasks, hence 
the need for simulated emergencies [28]. Because the effects of overlearning diminish significantly with 
time, organizations usually adopt refresher training to retrain employees periodically [36,45].  
The KSAs learned must be transferred to practice. Transfer is easier when the actual task is highly 
similar to the training. Usually, organizations plan specific adapting training to facilitate the transfer 
process [46]. Simulators with limited physical fidelity are often quite adequate [39,47]. For example, 
there is little evidence that motion in flight simulators, which cannot approach the actual motion of an 
aircraft, offers positive transfer benefits [48]. 
3.1.5. Conceptual Model of Training and Organizational KSA 
Next we model the relationship between training and organizational KSA as shown in Fig. 6. Here the 
level of training on the x-axis encompasses the three dimensions discussed in Section 3.1.1. The 
relationship is path dependent. The organizational KSA depends not only on the current level of training, 
but also on the past history of training. For example, if the organization has had a past of extensive 
training, some expertise will be retained in the short and medium term even if training is cut. 
In general, as training increases, the organizational KSA increases, as shown by curve A-B. When the 
training sufficiency is low, employees cannot master the desired KSAs (low training depth and re-training 
frequency), lack some kinds of KSAs (low training breadth and inadequate organization coverage). Only 
once training is increased to a certain sufficiency, does the organization KSA increase. Finally, the 
organization will reach a point where additional training cannot further increase KSAs due to human and 
organizational limitations (an organization that spend too much effort on training will also become 
unacceptably unproductive). 
  
Fig. 6. Conceptual model of training-organizational KSA 
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Less Adequate More Adequate
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It is usually possible to reduce training without seeing immediate adverse effects, since, as discussed 
above, KSAs are not instantaneously lost because of the retention. Therefore an organization that has 
invested in training in the past will be left with residual KSA, as shown by curve B-C. As training is cut 
more, the KSAs will further decline. 
3.2. Step 2: Relationship between Organizational KSA and Employee performance 
Employee performance depends on the interaction of the organizational KSA, employee motivation, 
and the organizational environment [16]. We model the relationship between organizational KSA and 
employee performance as shown in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7. Relationship between organization KSA-employee performance 
When the organizational KSA is low, employee performance will be low. Only once the organizational 
KSA is increased to a certain level, the performance increases rapidly. But it cannot be improved 
unlimitedly due to restrictions, such as the highly formalized organization allow little freedom for 
employees to consider and engage alternative behaviors even they have proficient knowledge and skills 
[49].  
Employee motivation significantly influences performance. Positive motivation derives from 
employees’ positive attitude that they can achieve desired outcomes, which encourages employees to 
perform what they have learned through training [50,51,52]. When employees are unmotivated, they may 
perform below their skill levels, as shown by the lower dashed line in Fig. 7. Employee performance also 
depends on the organizational environment. Company policies, reward systems and supervision behaviors 
are important in determining the organizational environment [53,54,55]. Supportive environment can 
provide positive intervention, such as trainer support after training, supervisor support, or peer support to 
improve employee’s performance [56,57,58].  
3.3. Step 3: Relationship between Employee Performance and Organizational Risk 
Based on the model first proposed by Moizer in his research about occupational safety, we propose the 
model shown in Fig. 8 to describe the relationship between the employee performance and organizational 
risk [20].  
Organizational KSA
Employee Performance
Low
Proficient
High
Lower Employee Motivation 
Supportive Organizational Environment
Less
Proficient
Steep acceleration
Plateau
Slow beginning
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Fig. 8. Relationship between employee performance and organizational risk 
The modeling concept is that the relationship is negative and exponential. Zero risk cannot be achieved 
for there are many other risk factors beyond the employee contributing to unsafe situations. As shown in 
Fig. 8, when employee performance is too low, risk is high. For instance, the Port Chicago disaster in 
1944, resulting in 320 deaths and 390 injuries, was caused by an explosion when the munitions being 
loaded onto a cargo ship [59]. In this accident, most of the laborers were unskilled. The commander of 
Port Chicago also had no training and very little experience in handling munitions loading. In contrast, if 
employee performance can be improved, the employees can understand the potential consequences of 
their actions or inactions and satisfy the safety requirements proficiently and rigorously, which means the 
safety-related organizational activities can be planned, executed and supervised more adequately. The 
organizational risk will be reduced. 
3.4. Step 4: The relationship between training and organizational risk 
To ensure organizational safety, employees must be capable of complex cognitive thinking to identify 
risky conditions, make correct decision and correctly execute remedial actions. Well-designed training 
should enhance employees’ ability to satisfy these requirements. In this section, we propose a model of 
training and organizational risk to illustrate how risk changes as the level of training is increased or 
decreased, as shown in Fig. 9. The level of training on the x-axis encompasses all the training dimensions 
mentioned in Section 3.1.1. The y-axis shows the level of organizational risk. Their relationship is path 
dependent. The organizational risk depends not only on the current level of training, but also on the past 
history of training. 
3.4.1. Risk declining when training increases (Curve A-D) 
In this model, the organizational risk cannot be reduced to zero by training. In fact, risk can never be 
reduced to zero (except by closing the organization, and shifting risk elsewhere), and, each risk reduction 
method on its own can only reduce risk to a certain level. 
When the training level is low, the organization is exposed to high risk (curve A-B). The training level 
will be low if training is done infrequently, with few members of the organization, or covers limited 
material. For example, at the BP Texas City Refinery, operators did not receive sufficient refresher 
training (less frequency) on procedure simulation (less breadth) [60]. As a result the operators could not 
Employee
Performance
Organizational Risk
Steep
acceleration
Slow beginning
Plateau
Less Proficient Proficient
Low
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properly perceive the risk posed by the rundown control valve. Further, not all managers took part in the 
Management of Change (MOC) training—as a result of this inadequate organizational coverage the 
temporary office trailer was located in an unsafe area. Most of the fatalities occurred in or around this 
trailer. Although the curve does not show time explicitly, note that the risk reduction benefits of training 
will often be delayed. That is, training does not immediately reduce risk. For example, a pilot may be 
adequately trained in go-arounds, but additional practice beyond the initial training will further increase 
their proficiency.  
 
Fig. 9. Conceptual model  of training- organizational risk 
Only once training is increased to a relatively high level, will the organization enter the B-C stage 
where the benefit of reduced risk accrues rapidly. The slope of the curve presents the risk-reduction 
efficiency of training. Training managers and team leaders can improve their leadership skills and 
enhance their ability to eliminate potential organizational risks. DuPont is a successful example of the 
impact of training [61]. Its management established a strong commitment to safety excellence to guide 
ongoing formal training programs from mangers to line employees. DuPont diminished the Total 
Recordable Injuries and Illnesses per 200 thousand hours worked from 1.17 in 2005 to 0.6 in 2011.  
As training is increased further, the risk will eventually stop decreasing. At this point risk cannot be 
further decreased by increasing training, other means must be tried. For instance, in a study on the effect 
of training interval on the use of computerized emergency operating procedures, highly frequent training 
resulted in high operation performance (shorter operation time) but had limited effect on reducing the 
error rate [62]. 
3.4.2. Risk rebounding when training decreases (Curve D-F) 
As discussed in Section 3.1.5, organizations may cut training to satisfy other short-term goals. If 
training is decreased, organizational risk increases slowly. When training is decreased, the risk will not 
increase immediately (curve D-E), because KSAs do not immediately decline (Section 3.1.5) and 
specifically because the safety culture instilled by proper training will not immediately disappear. While a 
discussion of safety culture is beyond the scope of this paper, for our purpose it is adequate to consider 
safety culture as a manifestation of the Attitudes imbued by KSA training. 
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However, if training keeps decreasing, high-level managers becomes less committed to safety and 
devote their efforts instead to obtaining short-term benefits and workers are no longer as competent as 
they should be and may choose to take shortcuts rather than following procedures. Finally, the decrease of 
training level eventually accumulates to render high risk situation (curve E-F). 
4. Tailoring the Model for a Particular Organization 
With the training-organizational risk curve, organizations can characterize their behaviors in the 
training-risk space. In general, the level of training required to achieve a given risk is organization 
dependent [63]. Organizations operating high-risk and complex systems such as civil aviation and nuclear 
power generators required higher levels of training. Fig. 10 shows how the curve of increasing training 
may vary between organizations. 
 
Fig. 10. Training-organizational risk curve of increasing training of different organizations 
The starting point for risk (point A) depends on the type of systems the organization is operating (e.g., 
nuclear power vs. a university) and the level of training of incoming employees (e.g., in tight labor 
markets, an aircraft manufacturer may be forced to hire untrained workers and train them in-house). 
Next, the impact of initial training depends on the complexity of the organization and the systems it 
operates (arrow 2). More training is required to reduce risk in complex organizations or on complex 
systems. For example, an organization with offices around the world may need training in cultural 
differences to make sure that employees know when and how to speak up about safety concerns. An 
organization operating in a single country or single location will need less such training. An organization 
operating complex systems will need more training to reduce risk. For example, more training is required 
to understand the interactions in a large chemical process plant than in a plant that manufactures boxes. In 
the Three Mile accident, the very confusing specific operating procedures combined with inadequate 
training led the operators to take incorrect actions [5]. The impact of training also depends on the 
organizational culture in which it occurs (arrow 2). For example, when training is done merely to satisfy 
for example certification requirements, employee performance with respect to safety is unlikely to 
improve. An organization with a positive safety culture will reap greater benefits from training. To avoid 
relaxed rules jeopardizing the training, better organizations arrange sufficient supervision to mitigate the 
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adverse attitude of “for compliance of rules” [64]. Moreover, better organizations make efforts to ensure 
that training is routinely evaluated at regular intervals [65]. These organizations, in which managers 
encourage the subordinates to cooperate with the inspections and audits, and demonstrate commitment to 
address the field finding, benefit more from training.  
Finally, the maximum benefit offered by training (point D) also depends on the systems the 
organization operates, and on the safety culture (arrow 3). Nuclear power plants will always be riskier 
than box factories (from a process safety perspective). Organizations with positive safety cultures will 
have lower risk than those without.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper introduced a conceptual model to illustrate how training affects the organizational risk. We 
argued that the relationship between training and risk is path dependent and non-linear. We built the 
model by considering training as a way of acquiring relevant knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs) and 
that these KSAs affect performance, which in turn affects risk. 
Based on this interpretation, we used a 4-step process to model training and risk. In Step 1, we first 
defined three training dimensions and five generic job types and relevant task types. Then we discussed 
learning, retention and transfer processes combining with mastery, refresher and adapting training and 
other employee individual characteristics in organizational KSA formation. We illustrated the relationship 
between training and organizational KSA as path dependence which mainly results from organizational 
KSA retention. In Step 2, we argued that overall employee performance is limited by the weakest 
members, individual motivation, and the organizational environment. In Step 3 we proposed a conceptual 
model of employee performance and organizational risk by referring to Moizer’s model [20]. By 
combining these three components we constructed the resulting path dependent model of training’s impact 
on risk. We also showed how the model can be tailored for a particular organization.  
We hope this paper can help high-level managers to understand the profile of the dynamics of risk and 
training and to improve their decision on training investment to achieve safer operation. In our current 
work, we are developing a quantitative version of the model. 
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